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The modern economic history of the Middle East and North Africa (henceforth, MENA) region 
has been the subject of a voluminous body of scholarship. Pioneering economic historians of the 
region all provided invaluable narratives of MENA history (e.g., Issawi 1982, Owen and Pamuk 
1998, Owen 2002, Kuran 2012). The objective of this chapter is to first provide the reader with 
an overview of the economic growth of the MENA region between 1870 and 2010. It will then 
analyze the underlying sources of growth (geography versus institutions) and the proximate 
sources of growth (labor, physical capital, and technology). In this regard, the chapter’s main 
contribution lies in putting together major empirical facts about the MENA region at the 
country-level on the long-term trends of key variables in economic development. These variables 
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include GDP per capita, democracy, population, fertility, mortality, migration, labor force 
participation, human capital, physical capital, and technology. 
The chapter includes four groups of countries within the definition of the MENA region: 
(1) the Levant (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria), (2) the Arab peninsula 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), (3) Egypt, 
Iran, and Turkey, and (4) North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia). The chapter does 
not include though other African and Asian countries with significant Muslim populations such as 
Sudan, Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of MENA economic 
history, starting with the de-industrialization of the Ottoman Empire and its integration into the 
world economy from 1870 up to World War I. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the inter-war period from 1914 to 1950. I will then discuss 
the post-Colonial state-led development period in the 1950s and 1960s, and the subsequent shift 
to the market economy that coincided with the surge in oil prices from the 1970s until 2010. 
Section 3 is the chapter’s core contribution. It first documents the long-term trend of real 
GDP per capita in 1870-2010, where I mainly draw on Pamuk’s (2006) estimates and the revised 
Maddison’s estimates (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). I then draw on various secondary data sources 
to document the underlying and the proximate sources of economic growth. Data sources 
include published statistics produced by the World Bank and the United Nations, and individual-
level population census samples published by Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at 
Minnesota Population Center. 
A puzzling fact that emerges about the economic performance of the MENA region is 
that it lagged behind the rest of the world (with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa) in the 
second half of the twentieth century, with respect to democracy, fertility decline, and female labor 
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force participation. The discussion of the role of geography and institutions highlights how 
geography, in particular, the abundance of natural resources, largely shaped the path of economic 
development in the region. It is also correlated with the emergence and persistence of 
undemocratic political institutions and coercive labor institutions. This is the case for the Arab 
States of the Persian Gulf, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and Iraq (Group A). By contrast, MENA 
countries that were less rich in natural resources (Group B) witnessed more diverse political 
development paths, although their political upheavals resulted more often in dictatorships. Their 
less reliance on natural resources made tertiarization more pronounced, though. 
2. MENA economic history since 1870: An overview1 
2.1 Europe’s rising influence and MENA’s de-industrialization (1870-1914) 
The economic history of MENA since 1870 has been largely shaped by the rising European 
influence in the region. The region’s increasing contact with Europe via trade, Europeans’ 
settlement in the region, and European capital inflows into the primary sector and the related 
trade sector, was associated with the “de-industrialization” of the MENA region throughout the 
nineteenth century. MENA traditional manufacturing sector lost competition to the more 
advanced and industrialized European manufacturing. 
Trade with Europe grew rapidly during the nineteenth century. Starting from the 1850s, 
the economies of many MENA countries became centered around the exportation of primary 
commodities (cash crops) such as cotton in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, silk and fruits in the Levant, 
tobacco in Turkey and the Levant, and sugar in Egypt. 
The expansion of the cultivation of cash crops was facilitated by the availability of 
uncultivated land. But faced with local labor scarcity, there was a surge in slave imports from 
Sudan, and in the coercion of local labor by large landholders. Expansion of the cultivation and 
exportation of cash crops were also made possible by the increase in European capital inflows, 
 
1 This section draws on Issawi (1982) and Owen (2002). 
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and the rise of the banking sector. This period also witnessed the emergence of private property 
rights on land. MENA countries stated to formalize land titles and codify the land tenure rights. 
This process was correlated with the expansion of cash crops. 
Europeans started to settle in the region to benefit from trade. North Africa, Egypt, and 
Palestine received an influx of European immigrants. Under the capitulation agreements between 
European states and the Ottoman empire, Europeans residing in the region held extraterritorial 
rights and were thus subject to their own consulates in the case of conflicts with local Ottoman 
subjects. Iran held similar agreements with Russia and other European powers under the Qajar 
dynasty (1794-1925). Although these agreements were initially reciprocal, the shift in the balance 
of power towards Europe meant that it was European settlers in the MENA region who 
benefited from the capitulations the most. 
It was not only European nationals who benefited from the capitulation agreements 
though, as European consulates started to sell the protégé status that granted access to European 
consular courts to Ottoman subjects. This was first directed at local subjects working in 
European consulates, but then extended to other groups, especially non-Muslim minorities. It has 
been suggested that the economic superiority of local non-Muslim minorities that has been 
observed throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was a consequence of the 
capitulations and the access to the European legal systems that came with the protégé status. But 
this narrative needs to be revised. First, while urban non-Muslim minorities: Armenians, Greeks, 
Levantine Christians, and Jews, may have benefited from the capitulations because they were 
traders and moneychangers, Coptic Christians of Egypt, the largest non-Muslim population in the 
region, did not, because they were artisans and bureaucrats. Second, the narrative often blurs the 
line between local non-Muslims and European immigrants who happened to belong to the same 
religious affiliation. In doing so, it tends to emphasize the “foreignness” of local non-Muslims. 
For example, European Christians and Jews are put in the same group as local Christians and 
Jews. This mixes up ethnic divisions with religious affiliation. 
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Along with trade and migration, the transportation sector grew. Large-scale transport 
projects were carried out in MENA including, most notably, the Suez Canal that was opened in 
1869. Steam ships started to navigate the eastern Mediterranean. The first railways line in the 
region was opened in the 1850s connecting Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt. The railways network 
expanded thereafter in the entire region. Telegraphs started to penetrate the region as well. 
The result of the growth of trade in cash crops and of transport was a secular decline of 
the manufacturing sector. Egypt’s attempt at state industrialization in textiles under Muhammad 
Ali Pasha, its autonomous Ottoman viceroy in 1805-1848, failed and most Egypt’s state textile 
manufactories closed down by 1868. In other MENA countries, the share of artisans declined. 
The de-industrialization was, at least partially, a consequence of the Anglo-Ottoman 1838 Treaty 
that reduced tariffs imposed by the Ottoman Empire.  
Faced by the rising influence of European powers, the Ottoman Empire attempted to 
increase its capacity to levy taxes and to conscript a modern army via implementing a series of 
military and fiscal reforms during the nineteenth century in what is known as Tanzimat. However, 
the increased Ottoman public debt led to its default in 1875. Egypt followed course in 1876. 
European powers gradually captured Ottoman province: Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and 
Egypt in 1882. Morocco, which was not part of the Ottoman Empire, was divided between 
French and Spanish states in 1912. The Levant remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the 
aftermath of WWI. Iran remained independent throughout the period under the Qajar dynasty. 
 
2.2 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the inter-war period (1914-1945) 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of WWI led to the formation of British and 
French mandates over the Levant: Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine became British mandates, whereas 
Syria and Lebanon fell under the French mandate. The inter-war period also witnessed the 
formation of modern nation-states, with many MENA countries gaining their full or partial 
independence. Egypt gained its partial independence from Britain in 1922, following a popular 
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revolt in 1919, while Britain continued to hold de facto power on Egypt, especially over the Suez 
Canal. Iraq gained its independence in 1932. The modern Turkish state was founded in 1923. An 
Iranian coup in 1921 brought the Qajar dynasty to an end and resulted in the establishment of 
the rule of the Bahlavi dynasty in 1925. Saudi Arabia was founded in 1933. 
 The new independent states attempted to impose national control over the economic 
realm. The capitulations were abolished in Turkey in 1923, Iraq in 1922, Iran in 1928, and Egypt 
in 1937. The Mandates of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan did not allow the capitulations. 
National central banks started to emerge. States also regained control over their tariff and trade 
policies by abolishing the commercial treaties with the European powers. Governments tried to 
increase nationals’ share in firm ownership, via establishing national banks and providing credit 
to locals through private banks. 
 
2.3 State-led development in the post-colonial period (1945-1973) 
The post-colonial period witnessed the rise of military regimes with socialist and nationalist 
ideologies. State-led development became the norm in the 1950s and 1960s under the presidential 
dictatorships of the region, including Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, and Libya. At the core 
of their economic agendas was a stated objective of completing the process of national 
independence. The major pillars of their legitimacy were the provision of public free education to 
the masses, confiscation of private entrepreneurships, nationalization of banks and private assets, 
and land redistribution. Guaranteed employment in the government and public sector for 
university and secondary school graduates became prevalent in most MENA countries, leading to 
an expansion in white-collar jobs, especially teachers and accountants. 
It remains an open question whether the state-led programs indeed achieved their 
objectives. While the programs stripped Europeans from their privileges, leading to their eventual 
exodus, they often targeted native non-Muslims. The exodus of the region’s urban non-Muslim 
minorities (with the notable exception of Egypt’s Copts), started in the aftermath of WWI but 
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intensified in the aftermath of WWII. And while the beneficiaries of the nationalization and land 
redistribution programs were in principle the masses, the programs more often than not ended 
up redistributing economic and political power to a new middle class of military and police 
officers. This new class quickly adopted the habits of the old elite and maintained the colonial 
exclusive institutions. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict which started during the interwar period with the intensified 
migration of European Jewry to Palestine has been an important factor that shaped the economic 
and political development of the region in the post-colonial era. It has been often used by 
military dictators to justify the lack of democratization of the region and the persistence of their 
notorious military regimes. It has also consumed a large portion of the economic resources of the 
region. 
 
2.4 The shift to the market economy (1973-2010) 
The 1973 oil crisis enabled the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to increase their economic 
and political power. Migration from MENA countries to these countries, in addition to Iraq and 
Libya, increased. Many MENA countries started to shift to liberalize the economy, while keeping 
their military dictatorships intact. However, the resulting market systems were still dependent on 
the state and turned into a form of crony capitalism. 
The liberalization of MENA economies was correlated with a surge in inequality. 
Alvaredo et al. (2018) document that the MENA region has one of the highest levels of income 
inequality in the world today. If we add to this the lack of democratization and the poor 
condition of human rights in the region, one can only conclude that the post-colonial regimes did 
not liberate MENA peoples from colonization. They instead preserved the coercive institutions, 




3. Economic performance of the Middle East in 1870-2010 
This section first documents the long-term trend of the economic performance of the Middle 
East in 1870-2010, measured by real GDP per capita. Second, I examine the underlying sources 
of growth: the relative roles of geography and institutions in driving economic growth in the 
region. Finally, I examine the proximate sources of growth, or the factors of production: labor, 
physical capital, and technology. 
3.1 Real GDP per capita in 1870-2010 
Figure 1(A) shows the long-term trend of real GDP per capita in 1870-2010. Data for the pre-
1950 period are scarce; only two data points are available for 1870 and 1913. Figure 1(B) depicts 
the corresponding average growth rates of real GDP per capita calculated over 1870-1913, 1913-
1950, and over 5-year intervals thereafter. Growth rates enable us to appreciate whether MENA 
countries achieved Modern Economic Growth (MEG), defined as sustaining an average growth 
of real GDP per capita of 1 percent per annum for a sufficiently long period of time so as to 
quadruple the standard of living. 
3.1.1 Levant 
There are two major facts about the Levant. First, with the exception of Iraq, the Levant is 
generally less rich in natural resources than the oil-rich countries in the region. Despite this fact, 
or perhaps because of it, the Levant has generally witnessed a steady growth trajectory starting 
from 1950, as its GDP was less sensitive to oil prices. The second fact is that the Levant was at 
the core of various foreign and civil conflicts: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq-Iran wars, the 
First and Second Gulf Wars, and the Lebanese Civil War. These conflicts led to sharp 
fluctuations in the region’s GDP, even within its non-oil rich countries. 
The non-oil rich but largely stable Israel witnessed the largest increase in its GDP per 
capita, which quadrupled between 1950 and 2010 reaching almost 20,000 PPP USD in 2010. 
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Syria’s GDP per capita witnessed a steady increase too, albeit with several fluctuations due to 
political turmoil, reaching 7,500 PPP USD in 2010 (the second richest country in the Levant after 
Israel as of 2010). Similarly, Jordan witnessed an increase in its real GDP per capita since 1950 
albeit with fluctuations due political turmoil, reaching ~5,000 PPP USD in 2010. Lebanon’s GDP 
per capita increased steadily until 1980, but then declined due to the Lebanese Civil War in 1975-
1990, before it recovered to reach slightly less than 5,000 PPP USD in 2010. Palestine’s economic 
performance improved steadily between 1950 and 2000, but it declined in 2000-2010, following 
the Second Intifada in 2000-2005. Iraq’s GDP per capita increased between 1950 and 1980 (it 
was the second richest country in the region after Israel in 1980), but then declined steadily due 
to the Iraq-Iran War in 1980-1988, the Gulf War in 1990-1991. The growth rates in panel (B) 
show that, within the Levant, only Israel sustained a positive growth rate from 1950 onwards, 
followed by Palestine (only until 2000). Jordan has maintained a positive growth rate since 1990. 
Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, all witnessed sharp fluctuations between positive and negative growth 
rates due to political unrest and, in the case of Iraq, fluctuations in oil prices.  
3.1.2 Arab Peninsula 
Despite its political stability, the oil-rich Arab peninsula (with the exception of Yemen) witnessed 
a less stable growth trajectory than the Levant due to the sensitivity of its economy to 
international oil prices. United Arab Emirates, the richest country in this group with a real GDP 
per capita of 15,000 PPP USD in 2010, witnessed an impressive growth between 1913 and 1960, 
a period of stability in 1960-1980, followed by a sharp decline in 1980-1985 after the end of the 
1970s oil crisis, and another period of stable economic performance in 1985-2010. The second 
and third richest countries, Kuwait and Qatar, exhibited a similar path of economic performance: 
an increase between 1913 and 1950, fluctuations in 1950-1980, a sharp decrease in the early 
1980s, and a stable performance since then. With its larger population, Saudi Arabia stands as the 
fourth richest country in the region in 2010. It also witnessed an increase in its real GDP per 
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capita in 1950-1980, followed by a decline. Oman, which relies less on oil than its neighbors, has 
witnessed a steady rise in its GDP per capita since 1965. The same applies to Bahrain, which 
exhibited a less impressive growth path. Finally, Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab 
peninsula, witnessed an increase in its GDP per capita since 1965. In terms of growth, whereas 
the oil-rich countries in the Arab Peninsula (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia) witnessed sharp 
fluctuations due to changes in oil prices, other countries in the region (Oman, Bahrain, Yemen), 
which are less dependent on oil, have mostly maintained positive growth rates since 1950. 
3.1.3 Egypt, Turkey, and Iran 
Within this group, Iran is a major oil producer. Nevertheless, it is the non-oil-rich Turkey that is 
the richest country in the group at 8,000 PPP USD in 2010 and that witnessed a steadily growing 
GDP per capita over the period. In comparison, Iran’s GDP per capita increased slowly between 
1913 and 1950, rapidly between 1955 and 1975 (due to oil), before it declined sharply in 1975-
1980, because of the political unrest that accompanied the Iranian Revolution. Its GDP per 
capita did not recover until after 1990. Compared to Turkey and Iran, Egypt had a less impressive 
growth trajectory, with a modest increase in 1955-1967, the period of the state-led development 
in the post-colonial period, followed by a decline in 1967-1975 due to the Arab-Israeli Wars in 
1967-1973. Egypt’s GDP per capita did not start to recover until after 1975. In terms of growth, 
while Egypt and Turkey have witnessed MEG since 1950, the rapid growth of Iran in 1956-1975 
was reversed after 1975 and its positive growth rates did not occur again until after 1990. 
3.1.4 North Africa 
Within this group, Algeria and Libya are major producers of oil and natural gas. However, 
consistent with the pattern that I documented in other regions; it is the non-oil-rich countries 
(Tunisia and Morocco) that maintained positive growth rates since 1950. Tunisia is the richest 
country in North Africa, whereas Morocco exhibited steady growth although at a slower rate. By 
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contrast, Algeria’s GDP per capita increased steadily until 1985, but then declined due to the 
Algerian Civil War in 1991-2002, and only began to recover in the 2000s. Libya’s GDP per capita 
increased sharply between 1960 and 1980 (albeit with fluctuations) but has declined steadily 
thereafter. 
3.1.5 Summary 
To sum up, and as Pamuk (2006) previously documented, although MENA oil-rich countries are 
still among the richest in the region after Israel, the heyday of their economic performance was 
reached around 1980, and their incomes declined thereafter due to fluctuations in oil prices. That 
was certainly the case for the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. It was also the case for Libya whose 
GDP per capita fell even below the two non-oil producing countries in North Africa: Tunisia and 
Morocco. Political unrest due to foreign and civil wars caused other oil-rich countries in the 
region (Algeria, Iran, Iraq), to witness frequent swings in their economic performance. Within the 
non-oil-rich camp, the more politically stable Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, 
and Yemen had steadier economic performance paths, with Israel and Turkey standing out as the 
most economically successful countries in the region. Political turmoil in Lebanon, Palestine, and 
Syria, triggered strong fluctuations in their growth trajectories, though. 
3.2 Underlying sources of growth  
Sources of economic growth can be classified into two groups: (a) underlying sources that include 
geographic and institutional factors, and (b) proximate sources, which are essentially the factors 
of production (excluding land and natural resources): labor, physical capital, and technology. In 
this sub-section, I discuss the underlying sources of economic growth in the region: Can the 
variation in economic growth across MENA countries be attributed to the variation in their 
geographic conditions, or rather to the variation in the quality of their economic and political 
institutions, such as the rule of law and democracy? 
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3.2.1 Geography  
MENA countries vary widely in their geographic conditions. First, there is wide variation in the 
availability of water resources and of temperate climate that makes agriculture possible. On the 
one hand, a few MENA countries are traditionally endowed with fertile cultivable land, either 
because of the existence of rivers (Iraq and Egypt), or rainfall (Turkey, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco). These countries typically have moderate climates and are 
mostly in the northern part of the region. On the other hand, Jordan and the Arab peninsula 
countries are mostly arid, with the exception of Oman and Yemen. Most of the surface area of 
Egypt, Libya, and Algeria is part of the African Sahara. 
Second, MENA countries vary with respect to the abundance of natural resources, such 
as oil and natural gas. While the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria 
are rich in natural resources, other MENA countries in the region are not as rich.  
Third, market access is largely determined by location and the length of the coast line on 
important international navigation routes. All MENA countries have access to the coast, with the 
exception of Jordan. The Persian Gulf is perhaps the most important navigable route in the 
region due to its huge oil reserves, followed by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea that are 
also important for oil transportation. In these seas, the Strait of Hormuz (UAE, Oman, and Iran), 
the Suez Canal (Egypt), and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb (Yemen) stand out as the most 
significant navigation bottlenecks. 
3.2.2 Institutions  
The quality of the political and economic institutions varies across MENA countries. Figure 2 
plots the long-term evolution of the Polity IV democracy index that ranges from 0 to 10, from 
the least to the most democratic. The figure reveals a well-known fact about the MENA region, 
namely that with two exceptions, Israel and Turkey, all the other countries in the region are 
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lagging behind the rest of the world with respect to democracy. It also reveals that although this 
has been a fact since 1950, there were short episodes of democracy in the histories of certain 
MENA countries (Syria and Egypt) that failed and were replaced by military regimes. In the 
Levant, Israel had the highest democracy index value in 1950 although it declined in the recent 
decades. Lebanon’s democracy score improved in the 2000s following the civil war. Syria had 
relatively high democracy scores in the 1940s and 1950s (albeit with interruptions of military 
rule), but it descended into absolute authoritarianism since the late 1950s. Jordan and Iraq had 
very low democracy scores throughout their history. Arab States of the Persian Gulf all have 
absolute monarchies (democracy score = 0). Egypt had a relatively high democracy score during 
its liberal period in 1922-1952, but it descended into absolute military rule since 1952. By 
contrast, Turkey’s democracy score improved throughout the twentieth century, despite episodes 
of military coups. Iran and North African countries all have very low democracy scores. 
 Perhaps correlated with authoritarianism, labor rights are generally weak in MENA 
region. Disguised forms of slavery are prevalent throughout the region, whether in the 
agricultural sector or among immigrants in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In fact, the region 
ranks among the worst regions in the world with respect to labor rights. 
Despite the poor democratization of MENA countries and its coercive labor institutions, 
they mostly score better with respect to rule of law and property rights. UAE has particularly 
high scores on both indexes. Qatar, Jordan, Israel, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia have relatively high scores as well. 
 Political stability varies across MENA countries. The Arab-Israeli conflict that started in 
the first half of the twentieth century with the increased European Jewish migration to Palestine 
under the British Mandate resulted in a series of wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1987, 
2000, 2006, and 2009 that directly involved, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, besides Israel and 
Palestine. The Persian Gulf region witnessed a series of wars between Iraq and Iran in 1980-1988, 
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and Iraq and a US-led international coalition in 1990-1991. Apart from international wars, Yemen 
witnessed a devastating civil war in 1962-1970, Lebanon in 1975-1990, and Algeria in 1991-2002. 
Popular revolts, military coups, and militant insurgencies by a faction of the population were 
commonplace throughout the region. The main exception here are the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf which were generally politically stable throughout the second half of the twentieth century. 
3.2.3 GDP sectoral composition  
Geography and institutions shape the composition of GDP across the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sectors in the MENA region. Figure 3(A) shows the share of the primary sector in GDP, 
which includes agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing and production of livestock. In the Levant, 
Syria had the highest share of the primary sector at around 30 percent, followed by Palestine, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, but it declined in all four countries over time. In the Arab Peninsula, 
Oman had in 1960 the highest share of the primary sector at 80 percent, although it declined 
rapidly thereafter due to oil discoveries. Turkey had a relatively high share of agriculture in GDP 
in 1960 (60 percent), compared to Egypt and Iran, but again, the share of agriculture declined in 
the three countries over time. The share of the primary sector persisted at around 20 percent in 
North Africa (the less agricultural Libya had a much lower share though). 
 Figure 3(B) shows the share of the secondary sector in GDP, which includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. One can interpret the mining component 
of the secondary sector as a proxy for the contribution of oil to GDP, although I am not able to 
separate mining from the other sub-sectors in the secondary sector. The other significant sub-
sector in the secondary sector, behind mining, is construction which is significant in many 
MENA countries. In the Levant, the share of the secondary sector increased in Syria and Jordan, 
reaching about 35 percent, but decreased in Lebanon and Palestine to 15 and 25 percent 
respectively. In the Arab Peninsula, the share of the secondary sector is the highest due to its 
reliance on oil. Iran had a relatively high share of the secondary sector due to oil, but the share 
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declined over time. Egypt and Turkey had a lower but increasing share of the secondary sector. 
In North Africa, Libya and Algeria had the highest shares of the secondary sector due to oil and 
natural gas industries. 
 Figure 3(C) shows the share of the tertiary sector, which includes services and trade. In 
the Levant, the share of the tertiary sector is high in Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine exceeding 70 
percent of GDP. The share of the tertiary sector in the Arab Peninsula is also sizable especially in 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Turkey witnessed a secular increase in the share of the tertiary 
sector that exceeded 60 percent by 2010. It also accounts for about 50 percent of GDP in Egypt 
and Iran. In North Africa, Tunisia and Morocco have a relatively high share of the tertiary sector, 
compared to Algeria and Libya that rely more on oil.  
 To sum up, while the oil-rich Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and 
Algeria have a relatively high share of the secondary sector, the primary sector is significant in 
Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, due to agriculture. “Tertiarization,” or the increase 
in the share of the tertiary sector was more pronounced in non-oil rich countries, such as Jordan, 
Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco. Only Turkey and Israel witnessed successful industrialization. 
3.2.4 Summary  
One can classify MENA countries into two groups. Group A includes oil-rich countries: Algeria, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). Group B includes non-oil-rich countries: Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.  
In Group A, the abundance of natural resources has been often blamed for crippling the 
democratization process of these countries. As the state does not rely on taxation as the main 
source of its revenue, the masses do not have enough incentive to rebel thus reducing their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruling elite, which is a necessary condition to introduce democracy. 
16 
 
Furthermore, the richness of the elite due to oil revenues enables it to grant subsidies to the 
masses to quiet rebellion. Consistent with this conjecture, the political systems of all countries in 
this group are authoritarian: either absolute monarchies (Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates), absolute monarchies with relatively more personal liberties (Bahrain, Kuwait), or 
presidential dictatorships (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya).  
In Group B, the relative scarcity of natural resources and the traditional reliance of most 
countries in this group on agriculture, imply that the social conflict is typically over the control of 
the coercive power of the (military) state, which enables the confiscation of agricultural land. This 
social conflict resulted, more often than not, in military coups, and only exceptionally, in 
democratic transitions. This pattern persisted even after the decline of the share of the primary 
sector. Industrialization succeeded in only two countries in this group: Israel and Turkey. This 
implied there was no significant capitalist class or “bourgeoisie” in most countries in Group B. 
The remaining countries in this group witnessed tertiarization and only limited state 
industrialization. Private business owners in the tertiary sector continued to rely on the (military) 
state. In terms of political system, Group B has more diverse regimes than Group A: two 
democracies (Israel, Turkey), authoritarian regimes with more personal liberties (Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco), and presidential dictatorships (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen). 
3.3 Proximate sources of economic growth 
There are two categories of the proximate sources of growth which are impacted by geography 
and institutions. The first are those that relate to labor, and the second are those that relate to 
physical capital and technology.  
3.3.1 Labor 
Economic growth can be partially driven by labor. This can be via an increase in the potential 
quantity of labor, measured by population growth, which is in turn attributable to natural increase 
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(births minus deaths) and/or net immigration. This potential labor force can be employed in 
production or not depending on the labor force participation rate and on the employment rate. 
Besides the increase in the labor force, economic growth can take place due to improvements in 
the quality or productivity of labor, or its stock of human capital, as measured by its educational, 
occupational, and health attainment. I examine these labor-related drivers of economic growth in 
the MENA region below. 
Population growth: natural increase or immigration?  
Figure 4(A) depicts the long-term trend of population size in MENA. All countries in the region, 
whether in Group A or Group B have witnessed rapid population growth since at least 1950. 
This growth could have been driven by natural growth, the difference between births and deaths, 
and by (net) immigration. Figures 4(B) and 4(C) depict the crude birth and death rates per 1,000 
people since 1950. Most MENA countries had 40-50 births per 1,000 people in 1950-1955, that 
were much higher than crude death rates (20-30 per 1,000), thus contributing to the rapid 
population growth starting from the 1950s that we observe in Figure 4(A). The interesting 
exceptions here are Israel, where the birth rate was relatively low as of 1950-1955, and Lebanon 
which had an exceptionally low death rate in 1950-1955.2 This pattern is consistent with the 
notion that both countries are among the most progressive in the region with respect to health 
and women rights. Mortality exhibited a rapid decline in all MENA countries since 1950, reaching 
a crude death rate below 10 per 1,000 by 2010 (except for Yemen). In the absence of pre-1950 
data on crude death rates, it is not possible though to date the start of the mortality decline in the 
MENA region. By contrast, the birth rate started to decline only later on, leading to an eventual 
slowdown in population growth. The lowest birth rates in MENA (slightly more than 10 births 
per 1,000) in 2005-2010 were achieved by Lebanon, UAE, and Qatar. Furthermore, Israel, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia all 
 
2 Notably, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco had relatively low death rates in 1950-1955 (~10-15 per 1,000). 
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reached relatively low birth rates (20-25 births per 1,000) by 2010. However, Iraq, Palestine, 
Jordan, Syria, and Egypt (all in Group B) still had relatively high birth rates in 2010 (more than 25 
births per year). 
The decline in birth rates indicate that many countries in the MENA region witnessed a 
demographic transition, i.e. a decline in fertility following the earlier decline in mortality. 
Examining the total fertility rate (TFR), the number of children ever born per woman (figure not 
shown) enables me to date the demographic transition. Whereas Lebanon, Iran, UAE, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, and Morocco achieved TFR below 2.5 by 2010, the majority of MENA 
countries still have relatively high total fertility rates. 
 Apart from the natural population growth, a number of MENA countries witnessed 
significant emigration and immigration waves that contributed to the population growth. Figure 
4(D) depicts the net migration rate, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants 
divided by the population. In the Levant, only Israel maintained positive net migration rates in 
1950-2010, peaking in 1950-1955 and 1990-1995, due to the continued Jewish immigration to 
Israel, mostly from Europe. Palestine witnessed consistently negative net migration in 1950-2010 
except in 1990-2000, the biggest shock being in 1965-1970 due to the 1967 war. Jordan absorbed 
most of the Palestinian diaspora in 1950-1970, especially the two large Palestinian emigration 
waves in 1948 and 1967. The civil war in Lebanon resulted in a large negative net migration 
shock in 1975-1990. Iraq also witnessed negative net migration shocks starting from 1985. 
 The Arab States of the Persian Gulf in Group A were by far the largest recipients of 
immigration in the MENA region that exceeded 10 percent of the population in UAE and Qatar, 
although immigration to Saudi Arabia slowed down after 1985. Similarly, Iran witnessed a large 
positive net migration rate in 1970-1990 that paradoxically was not reversed during the Iranian 
Revolution (although it became negative in 1990-1995). Libya witnessed large positive net 
migration rates in 1955-1985 but then stopped afterwards. 
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 To sum up, the rapid population growth in MENA countries after 1950 is mostly 
attributed to natural population increase except in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and Libya 
in Group A, and Jordan and Israel in Group B, which received large immigration waves. 
Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq witnessed large emigration shocks due to political instability, but 
these waves were offset by the high fertility rates in these countries.  
3.2.2 Labor force participation and employment 
Even if MENA countries witnessed rapid population growth in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the labor force may not have increased as much due to the non-participation of a 
significant share of the population in the labor market, especially women. Low rates of female 
labor participation in the region have been long documented. They are attributable to both (1) 
the under-enumeration of women employment in population censuses and household surveys, 
and (2) institutional and cultural factors that hinder the participation of females in the formal 
labor market (e.g., discrimination against females). 
 To examine the evolution of labor force participation among males and females, I first 
employ the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) for the period 1960-2010. Figure 5(A) 
shows that male labor force participation is at least 60 percent in MENA countries, although 
there were negative shocks in certain years in Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. By contrast, 
females were traditionally much less likely to participate in the labor market in most MENA 
countries, although they achieved considerable progress in recent years. The paradoxical 
exception here is Turkey where female LFPR was the highest in the MENA region (65 percent) 
in 1960 but declined systematically over time. Israel had the second highest female LFPR in 1972 
(32 percent) and improved over time to reach 53 percent in 2010. However, the largest gains in 
female LFPR were achieved by the Arabs States of the Persian Gulf in Group A: Kuwait, Qatar, 
UAE, and Bahrain. Females in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco achieved only modest progress.  
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 I augment the analysis of LFPR by employing the individual-level population census 
samples that are available on IPUMS-International for Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Iran, 
Turkey, and Morocco. I restrict each population census sample to individuals between 30 and 60 
years of age (prime working age), in order to isolate secular changes across cohorts from life-cycle 
changes in labor force participation. I then pool the population census samples for each country 
and plot the percentage of those who are in the labor force among each of males and females 
across (decennial) cohorts of birth. Figure 5(B) shows the long-term trend of labor force 
participation by sex and cohort of birth. While males had close to universal participation in the 
labor force (at least 80 percent) in most countries in the sample, female labor force participation 
rate is very low. The two exceptions here are Turkey and Israel. The former had female LFPR 
around 40 percent for all cohorts born between 1920 and 1960. The latter had increasing female 
LFPR reaching more than 60 percent for the 1960s cohort. Females in all other countries made 
little progress, except Jordan. Employment rates (figure not shown) exhibit very close trends to 
LFPR, implying that unemployment is not significant within this age group (30-60 years of age). 
3.2.3 Human capital: educational, occupational, and health outcomes 
Did the “quality” of the labor force, or its stock of human capital, increase in the MENA region? 
To address this question, I plot in Figure 6 the long-term trends of the educational, occupational, 
and health attainment of labor. Figure 6(A) indicates that the average years of schooling has gone 
up across cohorts of birth in MENA countries, and that female education converged to that of 
males, or even exceeded it. Israel has the highest educational attainment in MENA and female 
education exceeded that of males by the cohort born in the 1960s. A similar pattern is observed 
in Jordan, where females also outperformed males in recent cohorts of birth. Palestine presents 
an interesting case where females were traditionally better educated than males, and males 
managed to converge in educational attainment only later on. Iraq witnessed an improvement in 
male educational attainment up to the 1960s cohort but then it declined, probably due to the 
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political unrest in the country starting from 1980. Educational attainment of Iraqi females did not 
converge to that of males. Outside Iraq and the Levant, Iran made the most significant 
improvement in educational attainment for both males and females, achieving complete 
convergence by the cohort born in the 1980s. Both Turkey’s and Egypt’s educational attainment 
increased significantly over time, but the male-female educational gap persisted. Morocco’s male 
and female educational attainment improved over time but remained lower than other countries 
in the group, and also did not achieve gender equality in educational attainment. 
 Figure 6(B) shows the long-term trend of occupational attainment across cohorts 
measured by the percentage of white-collar workers among employed individuals. An interesting 
pattern emerges: while the share of white-collar workers increased up to the 1960s cohort, it 
declined in younger cohorts. Jordan had the highest share of white-collar workers although it 
declined among males starting from the cohort born in 1960, and among females starting from 
the cohort born in 1970. Palestinian females increased their share of white-collar workers, while 
males witnessed a decline in the share of white-collar workers starting from the 1960 cohort. 
Similarly, Iraqi males witnessed a decline in the share of white-collar workers starting from the 
1960 cohort, although Iraqi females improved their share. Egypt had the highest share of white-
collar workers among employed males reaching 30 percent in the 1960 cohort, although it started 
to decline afterwards. Egyptian female occupational attainment improved as well although it also 
declined after the 1960 cohort. In Iran, Turkey, and Morocco, male occupational attainment also 
improved and then declined. Female occupational attainment improved as well, although the 
male-female occupational gap persisted.  
Finally, Figure 6(C) shows the long-term trend of health attainment as measured by life 
expectancy at birth. All MENA countries witnessed a secular improvement in health conditions, 
where life expectancy at birth almost doubled in most MENA countries between 1950 and 2010. 
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 To sum up our findings so far, although educational attainment improved in most 
MENA countries across cohorts, occupational attainment improved up to a certain cohort and 
then declined. Furthermore, while the gender educational gap disappeared in many countries, the 
occupational gap (among employed individuals) was more likely to persist. There are two 
explanations for these findings. First, the secular improvement in occupational attainment up to 
the 1960s cohort was perhaps driven by the expansion in the government size in the post-
colonial period. Newly founded bureaucracies, public schools that provided education to the 
masses, and public hospitals that provided health services, were all in need for recruitment of 
teachers, physicians, and accountants, hence the improvement in occupational attainment that is 
observed across cohorts up to the 1960 birth cohort. This process was often formalized in 
issuing employment guarantees in the government and public sector for secondary school and 
university graduates. However, the over-employment in the government led to a reduction in size 
after a certain point, hence triggering the decline in occupational attainment. Second, while 
female educational attainment increased, it was less translated into better outcomes on the labor 
market; female labor participation increased but remained modest, and the gender occupational 
gap persisted. This suggests that female education was aiming at non-labor market outcomes 
more than labor outcomes, such as finding a better match on the marriage market. 
3.3.2 Physical capital and technology  
It is not possible to disentangle the contribution of physical capital in driving economic growth in 
the MENA region. But to have an idea about its potential contribution, I employ the share of 
fixed capital formation in GDP as a proxy for changes in physical capital in Figure 7(A). Gross 
capital formation consists of “outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories.”3 Investment in fixed assets and infrastructure in MENA 
 
3 According to the World Bank, “fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held 
by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and work in progress.” 
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region was mostly state-led and partially driven by state revenues from natural resources. It often 
occurred subsequentially to civil and foreign wars due to the reconstruction efforts. In the 
Levant, the share of gross capital formation in GDP fluctuated between 20 and 40 percent. It 
peaked in Israel and Syria in the 1970s, in Jordan in the 1980s, and in Lebanon in the 1990s (in 
the aftermath of the Civil War). In the Arab Peninsula, gross capital formation share in GDP is 
lower, fluctuating between 10 and 30 percent. It increased in most Gulf States (Oman, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) in the 1970s and 1980s, in the aftermath of the Oil crisis, and in 
Kuwait in the 1990s following the Gulf war. Iran had systematically higher gross capital 
formation rate than Egypt and Turkey, although gross capital formation in the latter countries 
increased in the 1980s. In North Africa, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia had gross capital 
formation rates between 20 and 30 percent of GDP, whereas the oil-rich Libya had very low 
gross capital formation rates that only increased in the 2000s.  
 How much did technology contribute to real GDP per capita growth? The share of high-
technology exports out of manufactured exports sheds some light on this question. Figure 7(B) 
plots the long-term trend of this variable over time. In the Levant, only Israel had a relatively 
high share of high-tech exports at 15-20 percent. Lebanon had a high share of high-tech exports 
in 2009-2010. Jordan’s share of high-tech exports was about 8 percent in 2000 but declined 
afterwards to less than 5 percent. Both Palestine and Syria have negligible shares of high-tech 
exports (less than 5 percent). In the Arab Peninsula, only Oman had a relatively high share of 
high-tech exports that reached 15 percent in 1989 but declined afterwards. Egypt, Iran, and 
Turkey all had low shares of high-tech exports. In North Africa, only Morocco had a relatively 





To conclude, physical capital and technical progress played less of a role in driving 
economic growth in MENA countries. The main exception here is Israel, and to a lesser extent, 
Oman, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon, which all made some progress in this regard. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted some major empirical facts about the pattern and sources of economic 
growth in the MENA region between 1870 and 2010. Some are probably old facts, while others 
are new and interesting. Consistent with what we know from Pamuk (2006), oil-rich MENA 
countries (Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya) did not exhibit a steady 
growth trajectory due to the sensitivity of their economies to oil prices. To the contrary, the non-
oil-rich countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Yemen) had more stable growth trajectories albeit with varying degrees of success. Another 
major source of economic instability in the region is the political turmoil due to civil and foreign 
wars which hit Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. The post-2010 democratic 
uprisings in the Levant and North Africa, and the consequent devastating civil wars that hit 
Libya, Syria, and Yemen, certainly added to the economic instability of MENA countries. 
 While this narrative suggests that geography, and in particular, the abundance of natural 
resources, largely shaped the growth trajectories of MENA countries, institutions played an 
important role too, although some may argue that these were themselves an outcome of 
geography. Oil-rich countries are in general authoritarian, because the elites use oil revenues to 
avoid mass rebellion. Non-oil-rich countries on the other hand are more diverse, but the lack of 
the bourgeoisie, except in Israel and Turkey, arguably hindered democratization in these 
countries too in the post-colonial period. Tertiarization did not change the power balance 
between the society and the state. The result of all this was the persistence of the coercive 
political and labor colonial institutions that were in some cases inherited from their Ottoman 
predecessors in the pre-colonial period and that continue to serve elite interests. 
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 Geography and institutions affected labor, physical capital, and technical progress, the 
proximate sources of growth. Population grew rapidly in MENA countries mainly due to natural 
growth, but migration had its effects especially in oil-rich countries (immigration) and during 
episodes of political turmoil (emigration). Human capital increased in terms of educational, 
occupational, and health attainment, although part of this improvement was mechanic due to the 
policies of public mass education and the guaranteed employment in the government and public 
sectors, which were adopted by the post-colonial military regimes. Investment in physical capital 
played a role in economic growth in war-struck countries and in oil-rich countries. Technical 
progress was minimal in most MENA countries except in Israel and a few others. 
The chapter leaves a lot to future research, though. The economic history of the MENA 
region requires a novel narrative that focuses on the living conditions of the local populations 
and that gives equal voice to all MENA peoples. This narrative should depart from the traditional 
nationalist-colonial dichotomy. The persistence of MENA’s coercive institutions should be 
documented objectively, regardless of the identity of the ruling elite, whether it is the Ottoman 
empire, the colonial administration, or the post-colonial military states, and whether it is foreign 
or local. This new narrative is possible. It can be built, not only on the colonial sources as has 
been traditionally the case, but more importantly on the various novel data sources such as 
population censuses and cadastral surveys that are preserved at the local archives of MENA 
countries, and that were either digitized or await digitization. These under-used local archival 
sources can arguably reshape our understanding of the economic history of the region. Instead of 
focusing solely on the macro-level and institutional questions, which have inspired the current 
literature and that continue to inspire scholars until today, the novel micro-level large-scale data 
sources, coupled with rigorous econometric techniques and in-depth historical analysis, can 
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Figure 1: Real GDP per capita and its growth rate, 1870-2010 
 
Notes: Real GDP per capita is calculated in PPP $. Growth rates are the average rates over the indicated periods. 
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Figure 2: Democracy index, 1870-2010 
 
Notes: The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is 
derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment and constraints on the chief executive 
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Figure 3: Sectoral composition of GDP, 1960-2010 
 
Notes:  Primary sector comprises value added in forestry, hunting, and fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock 
production. Secondary sector comprises manufacturing, which corresponds to ISIC divisions 15-37, and includes value 
added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Tertiary 
sector comprises services, which correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99, and include value added in wholesale and retail 
trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such 
as education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and 
any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is 
the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin 
of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.  
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, consulted from World 
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(C) Crude death rate (per 1,000), 1950-2010 
 
(D) Net migration rate (per 1,000), 1950-2010 
 
 
Figure 4 (cont.): Population, births, deaths, and migration, 1870-2010 
 
Notes: Crude birth/death rate is the number of births/deaths over a given period divided by the person-years lived by 
the population over that period. It is expressed as average annual number of births/deaths per 1,000 population. 
Sources: Population: Bolt and van Zanden (2013); Issawi (1982) and Hershlag (1997). Additional data points for 
Egypt’s population are from the Egyptian population censuses of 1882, 1897, 1907, 1917, 1927, 1937, and 1947. Births, 
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(A) Labor force participation rate (%), 1960-2010 (ILOSTAT) 
 
(B) Labor force participation rate (%) by cohort of birth, 1910-1970 (IPUMS) 
 
Figure 5: Labor force participation rate 
Notes: Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15 and older that is economically active 
(employed + unemployed): all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services. 
Sources: Panel (A): International Labor Organization, ILOSTAT database (2017), World Development Indicators. 
Panel (B): Individual-level population census samples of Egypt (1986, 1996, 2006), Iran (2006, 2011), Iraq (1997), Israel 
(1972, 1983, 1995), Jordan (2004), Morocco (1982, 1994, 2004), Palestine (1972, 2007), and Turkey (1985, 1990, 1994, 
2000). Samples are pooled for each country and restricted to individuals between 30 and 60 years of age. Retrieved 
from Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [dataset]. 
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Figure 6 (cont.): Human capital 
 
Notes: Panel (A): The average years of schooling is calculated based on the educational attainment variable: 0 years of 
schooling if no schooling, 3 years of schooling if less than primary completed, 5 and 6 years of schooling if primary (5 
years) completed and primary (6 years) completed, respectively, 9 years of schooling if lower secondary general or 
technical completed, 12 years of schooling if secondary general or technical completed, 14 years of schooling if some 
college completed or have post-secondary technical education, and 16 years of schooling if university completed. Panel 
(B): Occupations are defined according to ISCO88 one-digit classification. White-collar workers are legislators, senior 
officials, managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, and clerks. Panel (C): Life expectancy at 
birth is the average number of years of life expected by a hypothetical cohort of individuals who would be subject 
during all their lives to the mortality rates of a given period. 
Sources: Panels (A) and (B): Individual-level population census samples of Palestine (1972, 2007), Iran (2006, 2011), 
Iraq (1997), Israel (1972, 1983, 1995), Jordan (2004), Morocco (1982, 1994, 2004), Turkey (1985, 1990, 1994, 2000), 
and Egypt (1986, 1996, 2006). Population census samples are pooled for each country and restricted to individuals 
between 25 and 60 years of age in Panel (A) and between 30 and 60 in Panel (B). Retrieved from Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
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(A) Gross fixed capital formation, 1960-2010 
 
 (B) High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports), 1988-2010 
 
Figure 7: Physical capital and technology 
Notes: Gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, 
and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital formation. High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such 
as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. 
Sources: Panel (A): World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files. Panel (B): United 
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